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Eichner: The "Silver Platter" No Longer Used for Serving Evidence in Feder

THE "SILVER PLATTER"-NO LONGER USED FOR
SERVING EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL COURTS
JAMEs A. EICHNER*

On June 27, 1960, the Supreme Court discarded a battered utensil
that has served unpalatable evidence for almost half a century.
2
Elkins v. United States' and its companion case, Rios v. United States,
wrote an end to the "silver platter" doctrine, under which unlawfully
obtained evidence, inadmissible if gathered by federal agents, could
be received in federal trials if obtained by state or local officers. Henceforth the admissibility of evidence obtained through unreasonable
search and seizure depends - with a few exceptions, noted later - entirely on the forum. Federal courts will exclude all such evidence,
regardless of the source. At present, courts in about half of the states
follow the "federal" exclusionary rule, whereas courts of the other
states retain the "common law" rule, which admits all relevant evidence, regardless of how obtained.3
This article will not deal with whether it is desirable to admit
unlawfully obtained evidence. 4 Its purpose is to review the process
by which a vital and increasingly intricate body of law evolved
through an accident of history whereby a crucial part of the law of
evidence developed simultaneously with a fundamental innovation
in the field of constitutional law. It is a process peculiarly American
because of its underlying problems of dual sovereignty and overlapping
jurisdiction, a process ironic because universally applauded federalstate cooperation in law enforcement has inevitably produced universally deplored conflicts in federal and state adjudication.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

The first Supreme Court decision holding evidence inadmissible
because obtained through unreasonable search and seizure was Weeks
OBA. 1949, Cornell University; LL.B. 1956, University of Richmond; member
of Richmond, Virginia, Bar.

180 Sup. Ct. 1437 (1960), reversing 266 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1959).
280 Sup. Ct. 1431, reversing 256 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1960).
3See appendix for classification by states.
4For opposing views see, e.g., Douglas, J., dissenting in Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128, 149 (1954); 8 WIaMO, , EVIDENCE §2184 (3d ed. 1940).
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v. United States,5 decided in 1914. The defendant's home was searched
without warrant by state officers 6 and later by a federal marshal. Incriminating papers were seized on both occasions. The Court found
that the federal officer's search was a violation of the right of the
defendant to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure as
guaranteed by the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
and that the trial court's order denying the defendant's timely application for return of the papers constituted "a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused. ' ' 7 The papers seized in the original
search by state officers had been turned over to federal authorities
too, but on this point the Court said: "As to the papers and property
seized by the policemen, it does not appear that they acted under any
claim of federal authority such as would make the [fourth] Amendment applicable to such unauthorized seizures."8
At that time the common law rule - admitting all relevant evidence without regard to how it was gathered - apparently was universal in America and the British Commonwealth. Iowa was the only
state whose court had held illegally seized evidence inadmissible, and
that holding was based partly on the often closely related question of
self-incrimination. 9 Iowa later rejected the exclusionary rule. 1° But
meanwhile other states began adopting the federal rule of the Weeks
case, and now they are about equally divided."
5232 U.S. 383 (1914).
GAs used in this article, the term state officer includes both state and local police.

,232 U.S. at 398.
Slbid.
9State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 96 N.W. 730 (1903). The search of the accused's home was held to violate the Iowa constitution's guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure, and to have been made solely for the purpose of
obtaining testimony to be used against him, which was held to violate the Iowa
constitution's due process clause. The Iowa court cited Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886), a self-incrimination case not involving search and seizure.
The Boyd case was unsuccessfully cited as authority for excluding evidence illegally seized by state officers in Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). See
Parsons, State-Federal Crossfire in Search and Seizure and Self-Incrimination, 42
CORNELL L. Q. 346 (1957). Most of the few British Commonwealth cases excluding

relevant but unlawfully obtained evidence involve self-incrimination rather than unreasonable search. See Cowen, The Admissibility of Evidence Procured Through
Illegal Searches and Seizures in British Commonwealth Jurisdictions, 5 VAND. L.
REV. 523 (1952).
lOState v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 191 N.W. 530 (1923).
"aThe tabulation in Volf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33-40 (1949), lists 30 states
and the British Commonwealth as following the common law rule of admissibility,
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Federal Enforcement and Limitation of the Weeks Rule
Wolf v. Colorado,12 decided in 1949, was an appeal from a state
court conviction based on evidence gathered in an illegal search by
state officers. The conviction was affirmed in a six-to-three decision.
The Supreme Court stated, for the first time, that unreasonable search
and seizure by a state officer violates the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. But the admission of such evidence in a
state court trial was held not violative of the Constitution; the exclusionary rule adopted for federal courts in the Weeks case "was not
derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendmeiit"
but was "a matter of judicial implication." 13
On the same day, in Lustig v. United States,14 the Court held that
a federal court could not receive evidence gathered by unlawful entry
into the defendant's hotel room by state officers who later called in
a federal agent who examined and selected evidence. Since the federal
officer had participated, it was as much a federal as a state search.
This result had been common in earlier cases. 15 The Lustig case is

17 states following the federal exclusionary rule, and one, Rhode Island, uncommitted. Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 531, 543-67 (1956), shows 28 states following the
common law rule (two with statutory modifications), and 20 states and the territories of Hawaii and Alaska following the federal rule. The appendix in the
Elkins case, 80 Sup. Ct. 1437, 1448-53 (1960), indicates some switches in both
directions and lists 26 states as excluding illegally obtained evidence and 24 as
admitting it. The appendix divides the decisions into the "Pre-Weeks," "PreWolf," and "Post-Wolf" periods. It points out that the new state courts of
Alaska and Hawaii have not yet ruled, but includes them as federal rule states,
apparently on the basis of federal rule decisions by their territorial courts. Since
the division is complicated by four states that admit some and exclude some illegally acquired evidence, and by one that seems to have reopened the question,
it seems that the best current appraisal is to list 21 states as following the federal
rule, 4 as following a limited federal rule, 24 as following the common law rule,
and one undecided, as shown in the appendix to this article.
12338 U.S. 25 (1949).
'31d. at 28.

'14338 U.S. 74 (1949).
'5E.g., Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927) (state police who seized
illegal whisky without a warrant held acting on behalf of the federal government);
Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927) (both Iowa policeman and federal
prohibition agent participated in illegal search); United States v. Butler, 156 F.2d
897 (10th Cir. 1946) (state police who searched a bootlegger's car after ostensibly
stopping it for a state traffic law violation held actually acting solely to enforce
federal liquor laws).
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notable mainly for a famous line of dictum restating the rule that
evidence wrongfully seized by state officers without federal participation can be introduced in a federal trial. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter
tartly put it, "a search is . . . not a search by a federal official if evidence secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a silver platter."16
Three years later the Wolf rule was qualified in Rochin v. California,1 7 in which a unanimous Court reversed a state court conviction
because the means used by state police to acquire evidence - forcing a
tube into the defendant's stomach to retrieve morphine capsules was so brutal as to "shock the conscience" and therefore violated the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. But shortly thereafter, in Irvine v. California,18 the Court, in a five-to-four decision,
upheld the Wolf rule, distinguishing Irvine from Rochin by its absence of physical assault on the defendant's person.1 9
Meanwhile the Wolf doctrine that unreasonable state searches
violate the fourteenth amendment was invoked in an effort to secure
a federal court injunction against New Jersey law enforcement officials to prevent them from using unlawfully seized evidence in a
state court trial. The petitioner in Stefanelli v. Minard2° argued that
since New Jersey followed the common law rule of admitting such
evidence,21 an injunction was needed to save him from irreparable
injury arising from violation of his rights under the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act. 22 The Supreme Court, in a seven-toone decision, ruled that federal courts should not intervene in such
a situation because of the "special delicacy of the adjustment to be
16338 U.S. 74, 78 (1949).
17342 U.S. 165 (1952).
18347 U.S. 128 (1954).
19The Rochin case also had an element of compulsory self-incrimination.
Compare two South African cases, cited in Cowen, supra note 9: R. v. Maleleke,
[19251 T.P.D. 491 (inadmissible because the accused was compelled to give evidence against himself); R. v. Maboya, [1927] C.P.D. 181 (admissible; search without
warrant but no compulsory self-incrimination).
20342 U.S. 117 (1951).
21State v. Lyons, 99 N.J.L. 301, 122 At. 758 (1923).
228 U.S.C. §43 (1947), now 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1952): "Every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress."
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preserved between federal equitable power and State administration
"23
of its own law ....
Five years later came Rea v. United States. 24 Narcotics were seized
by a federal agent under a defective search warrant. This evidence,
and testimony regarding it, was ordered suppressed; and the case was
dismissed under the Weeks rule and Rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which says that evidence so suppressed "shall
not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial." On the same
day the federal agent obtained a state warrant charging violation of
the New Mexico narcotics statute. New Mexico, like New Jersey,
permits introduction of illegally acquired evidence.25 To prevent
this, the accused returned to the federal court and sought an injunction to keep the federal agent from producing or testifying about
the suppressed evidence in the state court trial. The district judge
denied the injunction, and the court of appeals affirmed. 26 But the
Supreme Court reversed, finding, in a five-to-four decision, that the trial
judge abused his discretion in refusing to grant the injunction. The
decision was not based on any constitutional question but on federal
courts' supervisory powers over federal law enforcement agencies. The
Court sought only "to enforce the federal Rules against those owing
obedience to them. . . .They are designed as standards for federal
agents." 2 7 The Stefanelli case was distinguished on the ground that
it involved state, not federal, officials.
In the following year, the Court ruled unanimously in Benanti v.
United States28 that evidence acquired by state officers by tapping a
telephone line, under a warrant issued by a state court pursuant to a
New York statute,29 was not admissible in a federal court because
disclosure of the content of the tapped conversation would violate
the Federal Communications Act.3 0 The eavesdropping police sus23342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951).
24350 U.S. 214 (1956). See Eichner, Impact of the Rea Case on the Law of
IllegalSearch and Seizure, 9 U. FLA. L. REv.178 (1956).
25Breithaupt v. Abram, 58 N.M. 385, 271 P.2d 827 (1954), aff'd, 352 U.S. 432
(1957); State v. Dillon, 84 N.M. 366, 281 Pac. 474 (1920).
2
0Rea v. United States, 218 F.2d 287 (10th Cir. 1954).
27550 U.S. 214, 217 (1956).
25555 U.S. 96 (1957).
29N.Y. CODE oF CaIM. PROC. §813-a.
3047 U.S.C. §605 (1953): "[N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall

intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any
person ....

"
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pected the defendant of violating the New York narcotics law. On
the basis of an overheard conversation, they stopped and searched a
car driven by his brother. It contained no narcotics but did contain
cans of liquor that did not bear the required federal tax stamps.
These were turned over to federal authorities who had previously
taken no part in the case. In the federal trial, on cross-examination
a detective admitted that the evidence had been obtained as a result
of wire-tap information. The court overruled a motion to suppress
this evidence, and the defendant was convicted. The court of appeals
unanimously affirmed. 3' Judge Medina pointed out that although
wire tapping was legal under New York law, to divulge the overheard
conversation would violate the Federal Communications Act. But
it did not follow that this made the evidence inadmissible. In
Schwartz v. Texas 32 the Supreme Court had upheld a state court conviction based on evidence obtained by state officers tapping a telephone, and in Goldstein v. United States33 a federal conviction based
on state wire-tap evidence was affirmed. To render such evidence inadmissible in a federal trial, Judge Medina had said in the Benanti
opinion, it must appear that a federal agent participated or that the
34
state police involved were acting primarily to enforce federal law:
"We can find no tenable distinction ... between the rule of
policy governing the admissibility . . .of evidence illegally ob-

tained by state officers through an unlawful search and seizure
. . . and the rule which should govern the admissibility of
evidence obtained by state officials under similar circumstances
in violation of the federal statute against wiretapping ...
[S]urely it cannot be that the violation of a federal statute
calls forth implied sanctions more pervasive than those formulated by the Supreme Court to compel obedience to a constitutional mandate."
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction without attempting to
answer judge Medina's reasoning. "We do not reach the constitutional

31244 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1957).
32344

U.S. 199 (1952).

3316 U.S. 114 (1942). But federal courts have long been prohibited from
receiving wire-tap evidence gathered by federal officers. Nardone v. United States,
302 U.S. 379 (1937).

34244 F.2d 389, 393 (2d Cir. 1957).
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questions," the Court said, "as this case can be determined under the
statute."35

Chief Justice Warren described the rationale of the Schwartz case
as follows: 36
"[D]espite the plain prohibition of Section 605 [the Communications Act], due regard to federal-state relations precluded the
conclusion that Congress intended to thwart a state rule of evidence in absence of a clear indication to that effect. In the
instant case we are not dealing with a state rule of evidence.
Although state agents committed the wiretap, we are presented
with a federal conviction brought about in part by a violation
of federal law, in this case in a federal court."
In a footnote the Supreme Court gave notice that it was not committed to the "silver platter" doctrine: "It has remained an open
question in this Court whether evidence obtained solely by state agents
in an illegal search may be admissible in federal court despite the
3
Fourth Amendment." 7
The open question was finally closed in 1960 in Elkins v. United

35355 U.S. 96, 99 (1957).
361d. at 101. This line was quoted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as
showing that the Benanti case did not overrule the Schwartz case. That, court
affirmed a bookmaking conviction, holding that evidence acquired by state police
by means of wire tapping was admissible in a state court trial. Commonwealth
v. Voci, 393 Pa. 404, 143 A.2d 652 (1958). Earlier, the defendant had lost in two
attempts to get a federal court injunction based on §605 of the Federal Communications Act to keep state officers from divulging the tapped conversation in
a state court trial: Vod v. Storb, 235 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1956), in which the injunction was denied on the authority of Stefanelli, and Voci v. Farkas, 144 F. Supp. 103
(E.D. Pa. 1956), in which the court said that the rule of Rea v. United States had
not changed the situation. The court did enter a consent decree prohibiting divulgence of the conversation except to the extent required in prosecution of
crimes solely within the power of the State of Pennsylvania. But see notes 73-80
infra and accompanying text.
37355 U.S. at 102, n.10. Shortly thereafter, however, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in a simple "silver platter" case, Gaitan v. United States, 252 F.2d 256
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 937 (1958), and also in a case similar to Rios
and Elkins in which the "silver platter" problem was combined with a prior state
court suppression of the evidence in question, Costello v. United States, 255 F.2d
389 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958). And a few months later it granted
certiorari in Rios and Elkins.
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States, in which the Supreme Court borrowed some of the logic of
Judge Medina's Benanti opinion:

35

"[lilt would seem logically impossible to justify a policy that
would bar from a federal trial what state officers had obtained
in violation of a federal statute, yet would admit that which
they had seized in violation of the Constitution itself."
THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

As the Supreme Court pointed out in Weeks v. United States,
search without warrant by a United States marshal violates the defendant's right guaranteed by the fourth amendment to be secure
against unreasonable search and seizure by the federal government.
But a similar search by a state policeman does not, since the first
eight amendments to the Constitution apply only to federal action.
It was not until years later that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment began to be interpreted as preventing the states
from doing some of the things forbidden to the federal government
by the Bill of Rights. Thus the due process clause came to incorporate the first amendment's guarantees of freedom of the press 3 9 religion'40 and speech 41 and the sixth amendment's guarantee of the
right to counsel.42 It does not, however, incorporate the fifth amendment's protection against double jeopardy 43 or guarantee of indictment by grand jury, the criminal jury trial guarantee of the sixth
amendment, or the civil jury trial provision of the seventh amend44
ment.
Search and Seizure under the FourteenthAmendment
When protection against unreasonable search and seizure was
added to the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment in Wolf v.
3880 Sup. Ct. 1437, 1443 (1960).

39Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
4OHamilton v. University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
41DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
42Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
43Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937).
44The appendix to this opinion contains an interesting tabulation of the state
constitutional guarantees of the states ratifying the fourteenth amendment.
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Colorado the Court stated again that the due process clause is not
"shorthand for the first eight amendments." 45 The fourth amendment's search and seizure provisions were read into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment only because freedom from unreasonable search and seizure "is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause. 46
The Wolf opinion stoutly adhered to the Weeks rule -that admission of illegally acquired evidence in a federal trial, as well as the
4
federal search which procured it, violates the fourth amendment. 7
This adherence, combined with the newly announced rule that the
fourteenth amendment protects against unreasonable state searches,
would seem to lead logically to the conclusion that the due process
clause forbids the use of such evidence - usually crucial - in a state
court criminal proceeding. But the majority avoided this result by
gently undercutting the doctrine to which it so stoutly subscribed.
The Weeks rule that the Constitution forbids admission of unlawfully seized evidence in a federal court "was not derived from the
explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment; it was not based
on legislation expressing Congressional policy in the enforcement of
the Constitution. The decision was a matter of judicial implication."4
Finally, the Court seemed to denude the question of admissibility of
all constitutional significance by strongly hinting that anything Congress wanted to do in establishing a rule of evidence would be all
49
right:
"[Tlhough we have interpreted the Fourth Amendment to
forbid the admission of such evidence, a different question
would be presented if Congress under its legislative powers were
to pass a statute purporting to negate the Weeks doctrine....
Problems of a converse character . . . would be presented
should Congress under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment undertake to ...make the Weeks doctrine binding upon the States."

45338 US. 25, 26 (1949).
46d. at 27. For a discussion of the extension of Bill of Rights guarantees via
the due process clause, see Howell, The Search for Jurispolitical Philosophy, 44

VA. L. RFv.409, 423-28 (1958).
47338 U.S. at 28.
48sbid.

491d. at 33.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1960

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1960], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

The Wolf opinion thus presents a notable combination of liberal
and strict constructions of the Constitution. It reads into the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment another guarantee not
expressly stated there. But it also says in effect - despite its recital
of stout adherence - that the Weeks opinion went unnecessarily far
in reading into the fourth amendment a rule of evidence not spelled
out by its framers.
The practical significance of not construing the due process clause
to forbid the admission of unreasonably seized evidence was soon
demonstrated in Stefanelli v. Minard, denying a federal injunction
against use in a state court of evidence seized in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. 50 For if the planned use of the evidence
constituted a clearly predictable future violation of the petitioner's
constitutional rights, it would have to follow that an injunction
would lie under the Civil Rights Act, which was enacted to enforce
such rights.51
REPUDIATION OF THE "SILVER PLATTER" DOCTRINE

In Elkins v. United States the defendants were first charged with
violating Oregon law prohibiting wire tapping. A state search warrant had been issued on information and belief that one defendant
possessed obscene pictures and sound recordings, but the ensuing
search of his home revealed no such material. Instead, police found
paraphernalia believed to have been used in wire tapping. The
defendants moved in the state trial court to suppress this evidence
as unlawfully seized. The motion was granted and the indictment
dismissed. Meanwhile federal officials, with a federal search warrant,
obtained these articles from a safe deposit box where state authorities
had placed them. A federal wire-tapping prosecution followed.
The federal district judge, without ruling on the lawfulness of
the state search, denied a motion to suppress because there was no
evidence of federal participation in the search.52 The court of appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction, agreeing that without federal participation it was not necessary to consider the lawfulness of
the state search. 53
5

OSee notes 20-23 supra and accompanying text.
51See note 22 supra.
52See Brief for United States, p. 4, Record, p. 17, 80 Sup. Ct. 1437, 1438-39
(1960).
53266 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1959).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol13/iss3/2

10

Eichner: The "Silver Platter" No Longer Used for Serving Evidence in Feder
THE "SILVER PLATTER"
The Supreme Court majority54 decided that the "silver platter"
doctrine can "no longer be accepted" and established the new rule
that evidence obtained by state police through unreasonable search
and seizure may not be received in evidence in federal trials. It
remanded the case for a determination by the federal district court
of whether the search was one "which, if conducted by federal officers,
would have violated the defendant's immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment ... ." The prior
state court adjudication, the Court held, was not binding on the
federal courts: "The test is one of federal law, neither enlarged by
what one state court may have countenanced, nor diminished by
what another may have colorably suppressed." 55
The Court reviewed the history of the "silver platter" doctrine,
starting with its announcement, "unobtrusively but nonetheless definitely," in the Weeks case, which first held inadmissible evidence
illegally seized by federal officers though not that seized by state police.
But when Wolf v. Colorado announced that unreasonable searches
by state police violated the fourteenth amendment, "the foundation
upon which the admissibility of state-seized evidence in a federal trial
originally rested . . . disappeared."56 The Court then gently chided
the various courts of appeals that had continued to follow the "silver
platter" rule after Wolf, noting that Wolf's "removal of the doctrinal
underpinning for the admissibility rule has apparently escaped the
attention of most of the federal courts," 57 curiously omitting from
the examples cited two "silver platter" cases in which it had
recently denied certiorari. 5s It cited with approval the statement of
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the only circuit
to abandon the "silver platter" rule, that "the Weeks and the
Wolf decisions, considered together, make all evidence obtained by
unconstitutional search and seizure unacceptable in federal courts." 59
54Stewart, J., wrote the opinion, in which Warren, C.J., and Douglas, Black,
and Brennan, JJ., joined.
5580 Sup. Ct. 1437, 1447 (1960). The district court has not yet ruled on remand
as to the legality of the search and seizure. Letter, Oct. 17, 1960, from C. E.
Luckey, U. S. attorney for the District of Oregon.

-Ild. at 1442.

S7Ibid.
58Gaitan v. United States, 252 F.2d 256 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 937
(1958); Costello v. United States, 255 F.2d 389 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
830 (1958).
59Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1958). This case involved
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For a federal court in a "federal rule" state to admit evidence
illegally gathered by state police, the Court pointed out, 60
"frustrates state policy . . in a particularly inappropriate and
ironic way. For by admitting the unlawfully seized evidence
the federal court serves to defeat the state's effort to assure
obedience to the Federal Constitution. In states which have
not adopted the exclusionary rule, on the other hand, it would
work no conflict with local policy for a federal court to decline
to receive evidence unlawfully seized by state officers."
As a practical matter, the Court stated, abolition of the "silver platter"
rule eliminated the difficulty of determining whether there was federal
participation in a state search or whether a search by state officers
only was primarily for the purpose of enforcing federal law.61
In Rios v. United States the same problem was presented. The
defendant was arrested without warrant in a taxicab by Los Angeles
police, who picked up a container of heroin from the floor of the
cab. In the state trial on a narcotics charge, this evidence was suppressed as unlawfully obtained. The evidence was then turned over
to federal authorities, who prosecuted the defendant for violation of
the federal narcotics act. The federal district court in Rios, unlike
Elkins, ruled the heroin lawfully seized, but based its order overruling the motion to suppress mainly on the "silver platter" doctrine.
This reasoning was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. 62 The
case was remanded only because the Supreme Court was dissatisfied
with the ruling on the legality of the seizure and required further
testimony as to exactly when the arrest occurred.

a search without warrant in a Maryland motel by Maryland police, summoned by
a suspicious motel operator. A search of luggage revealed money which, it turned
out, had been stolen in the District of Columbia. The federal prosecution was for
a local rather than a national crime, one which anywhere else in the country
would have been tried in a state court. Since the Supreme Court's announced
policy has been to avoid interference with local rules of law laid down by courts
of the District, Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 476-77 (1946), the Hanna case
really amounted to nothing more than a court of one state refusing to receive
evidence illegally gathered by police of another state.

6080 Sup. Ct. 1437, 1446 (1960).
-Id. at 1440-42; see note 15 supra.
62256 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1958).
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Critique by Justice Frankfurter
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in the combined dissent to Rios and
63
Elkins, proposed a modification of the "silver platter" doctrine:
"[A~lthough I find no good reason not to admit in federal
courts evidence gathered by state officials in States which would
admit the evidence, I would not admit such evidence in cases
like the present, where state courts, enforcing their exclusionary
rules, have found their officers guilty of infractions of the rules
properly regulating their conduct and have suppressed the evidence."
64
Aside from this view, he and three other members of the Court
agreed that the "silver platter" doctrine should be retained. They
denied that "the distinction between federal and state searches has
been particularly difficult of application"6 5 and foresaw more serious
difficulties arising from the new rule. From now on, they said, federal
courts, while "adjudicating motions to suppress state evidence," must
"decide the wholly hypothetical question" whether the search in
question would have violated the fourth amendment if conducted by
federal agents. They also complained of "the complete absence" of
"criteria distinguishing those federal regulations of the conduct of
federal officers which are compelled by the Constitution from those
which are entrusted to the discretion of Congress or the courts to
develop."66
It is difficult to see why, at a hearing on a timely pretrial motion
to suppress evidence, a judge should find it more difficult to determine
the reasonableness of a search by a state officer than a search by a
federal agent. Purely statutory prohibitions would continue to operate
on state evidence in a federal court, such as the bar to divulgence of
telephone conversations tapped by state police.67 Presumably a local
sheriff or detective would not be held to thorough knowledge of the

6380 Sup. Ct. 1453, 1462 (1960). Two other "silver platter" convictions were
remanded without opinion on the same day: Euziere v. United States, 80 Sup. Ct.
1615 (1960), reversing 266 F.2d 88 (10th Cir. 1959); Camara v. United States, 80
Sup. Ct. 1619 (1960), reversing 271 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1959).
64Harlan, Clark, and Whittaker, JJ.
6580 Sup. Ct. 1453, 1458 (1960).
6Id. at 1459.
67See notes 28-36 supra and accompanying text.
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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The injunction in Rea v.
United States against a federal agent's testifying in a state court was
based on federal courts' "supervisory powers over federal law enforcement agencies" and their obligation to "enforce the federal Rules
against those owing obedience to them."6 8
The dissenters in Elkins and Rios also feared the requirement that
federal courts make an independent inquiry into the lawfulness of a
state search even though its illegality had been previously adjudicated
in a state court proceeding. The dissent said: 69
"The Court's new rule creates potential conflict between federal and state courts even when the legal standards of police
conduct upon which exclusion is to turn are the same in both
courts.... [A] federal tribunal may hold state officers blameless
after a state court has condemned their conduct, or it may hold
them to have been at fault after the State has absolved them.
I cannot imagine the justification for . . . debilitating local
authority in matters over which the local courts should and do
have primary responsibility."
Potential conflict is inherent in the American system of dual sovereignty and frequently overlapping criminal jurisdiction, as demonstrated by the line of cases stretching from Weeks to Rea to Elkins.
The procedure suggested by the Elkins-Rios dissent would bind the
United States by a state court ruling on admissibility in which the
United States had not participated, and which might have been
made on an incomplete presentation of the facts.-0 And it would
make impossible development of a uniform set of standards to be applied in federal prosecutions throughout the nation.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter also complained of the result in a situation in which state law imposes standards of police conduct more
strict than the unreasonable search and seizure provision of the Constitution. The Elkins-Rios rule, Justice Frankfurter declared71
"flouts such a state regulation. A state officer who disobeys it
68350 U.S. 214, 217 (1956).
6980 Sup. Ct. 1453, 1461 (1960).
7

on the Elkins case, the federal court hearing on admissibility of the seized

evidence appears to have been more thorough than the state court hearing. In
the latter, e.g., the prosecution was not permitted to present evidence or argument
on the legality of the seizure. Brief for United States, pp. 9, 37.
7180 Sup. Ct. 1453, 1460 (1960).
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needs only to turn his evidence over to the federal prosecutor,
who may freely utilize it under today's innovation in disregard
of the disciplinary policy of the State's exclusionary rule."
Again, the alternative -to bind federal authorities by the more
stringent state rule - would make uniformity impossible by making
it possible to convict a violator of federal law in a federal court
sitting in one state but impossible to convict him of the same violation
in another state whose search and seizure rules were more stringent,
although the facts surrounding the seizure were the same in both
cases.
The comity argument of the dissent does not make sense. If the
Supreme Court continues to recognize "the freedom of the states to
develop and apply their own sanctions in their own way," as the
Elkins majority states,7 2 citing Wolf v. Colorado, surely it should not
surrender to the courts and legislatures of fifty states the freedom of
the federal judiciary to develop its sanctions and rules of evidence.
Pugach and Other Procedural Problems
On the same day that it abolished the "silver platter" doctrine
in Elkins and Rios, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pugach
v. Dollinger.73 Here, as in Benanti, New York detectives had tapped
the petitioner's telephone under authority of a state court's statutory warrant. The information thus obtained was revealed before
a state grand jury, and the petitioner was indicted. He asked a
federal district court to enjoin the New York district attorney, police
commissioner, and others from divulging that information in the
state court trial. The district court refused the injunction.74 A panel
of the court of appeals ruled two to one to stay use of the evidence, 75
distinguishing Stefanelli v. Minard76 - in which a federal injunction
against state use of evidence acquired by illegal state search was
denied - on the ground that in the Pugach case relief was sought
to stop "the commission of a separate federal crime in futuro."'77
Ct. 1437, 1446 (1960).
7380 Sup. Ct. 1614 (1960).
74Pugach v. Sullivan, 180 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
75Pugach v. Dollinger, 275 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1960).
76342 U.S. 117 (1951); see notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
77275 F.2d at 507. It was pointed out that since the Benanti decision some
New York state courts had ceased issuing statutory wire-tap warrants, while others
7280 Sup.
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Judge Medina pointed out that the same court on the same day had
denied a writ of habeas corpus to one convicted in a state court on
the basis of wire-tap evidence,'7

so that without an injunction there

could be no protection against a divulgence in court held in Benanti
to violate the Federal Communications Act.
The court of appeals en banc reversed, four to one, saying that
the case was governed by Stefanelli, but continuing the stay order
for the purpose of appeal. 79 The same opinion affirmed the decision
of the district court refusing an injunction against divulgence of wiretap evidence in a state court on the ground that the state trial had
begun and many witnesses had already testified.8 ° The district court
order followed by a few days the original Pugach order.
The problem thus presented to the Supreme Court in Pugach
recalls Justice Harlan's dissent in Rea v. United States. Protesting
against a federal injunction barring a federal agent's testimony in a
state court as to evidence suppressed as illegally seized in a prior
8
federal trial, he said: '
"To say that federal interference is . . . justified at this point

in the proceedings whenever the State has not yet obtained
the evidence seems to me to make the matter simply a race
between a state prosecution and a federal injunction proceeding."
If the Supreme Court should reverse the court of appeals and adopt
Judge Medina's test of allowing a federal injunction when the viocontinued to do so. Id. at 508. See, e.g., In the Matter of an Application for an
Order Permitting the Interception of Telephone Communications, 198 N.Y.S.2d
572 (N.Y. County Ct. Gen. Sess. 1960). A similar federal injunction against New
York authorities' use of wire-tap evidence before a state tribunal had been granted,
on authority of Benanti, in Burack v. State Liquor Authority, 160 F. Supp. 161
(E.D.N.Y. 1958).

78Graziano v. McMann, 275 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1960).
79Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1960). A later opinion by the
court of appeals clarified the scope of the temporary stay order, stating that it
included not only wire-tap evidence itself but also any evidence obtained as a
result of leads contained in the tapped conversation. U.S. Ct. App., 2d Cir.,

July 12, 1960, Friendly, J., reported in 46 A.B.A.J. 1017 (1960).
800'Rourke v. Levine, 181 F. Supp. 948 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 277 F.2d 739 (2d Cir.
1960). Previously the court of appeals had denied a stay pending appeal, and
Harlan, J. likewise declined to intervene. 80 Sup. Ct. 623 (1960).
81350 U.S. 214, 220-21 (1956).
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lation of federal law by state police is in futuro, the availability of
relief may well depend on how long state authorities can keep secret
the fact that they have tapped a telephone to obtain evidence.
The ultimate ruling of Pugach logically should be confined to
the special case of threatened future revelations of intercepted telephone conversations prohibited by the Federal Communications Act,
which state police, like all citizens, presumably are required to obey.
The decision should have no effect on the admissibility of evidence
acquired by physical search and seizure that is prohibited by the
fourth or the fourteenth amendments. The Elkins and Rios decisions destroying the "silver platter" doctrine state dearly that a
federal court may not receive evidence acquired by any officer, state
or federal, through unreasonable search and seizure, thus making a
constitutional violation the reason for inadmissibility. Federal and
state rules that evidence illegally obtained by private persons not em5 2
ployed by or accompanying police is admissible are left intact
Elkins and Rios expressly reaffirm the Wolf doctrine that a state court
may receive evidence seized by state officers in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The opinion mentions Stefanelli in passing, giving
no hint of weakening that case's rule that a federal court will not
enjoin state officers from producing in a state court evidence they
have unlawfully seized.
But doubt lingers about the future use in state courts of evidence
unlawfully seized by federal agents when there has been no prior
federal prosecution ending in an order suppressing its use, as in Rea.
The Rea majority expressly "put all constitutional questions to one
side"8 3 and based the federal injunction against a federal agent's
testimony in a state trial on his obligation to obey the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which state in plain language that after a
federal court grants a motion to suppress as evidence property unlawfully seized, "it shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing
or trial."84
The Rea majority's unnecessarily broad language about "our
82Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Gilliam v. Commonwealth, 263
Ky. 342, 92 S.W.2d 346 (1936); see Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 571-73 (1956). But evidence
illegally obtained by a private person is not admissible if that person was employed by police for the purpose, People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d 590, 290 P.2d
505 (1955), or accompanied police on the search, Copley v. Commonwealth, 219
Ky. 498, 293 S.W. 981 (1927).
83Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 216 (1956).
84FrD. R. Csrs. P. 41 (e). (Emphasis added.)
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supervisory powers over federal law enforcement agencies,"' '5 coupled
with some later dicta attributing to Rea a much broader significance
than its facts warrant,86 indicates a fair chance of success for an original
federal injunction proceeding to prevent future use in state courts of
evidence unlawfully seized by federal agents, even without a prior
federal prosecution ending in suppression of the evidence.
The Supreme Court in Elkins found it "logically impossible" to
justify a rule excluding from federal trials evidence seized by state
police in violation of a federal statute but admitting "that which they
85350 U.S. at 217. Harlan, J., author of the Rea dissent, objected strongly to
this: "So far as I know, this is the first time it has been suggested that the federal
courts share with the executive branch of the Government responsibility for
supervising law enforcement activities as such." Id. at 218. He quoted this line
from McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943): "We are not concerned
with law enforcement practices except in so far as courts themselves become instruments of law enforcement."
86
1n Badillo v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 269, 294 P.2d 23 (1956), a state
court that follows the federal rule of excluding illegally acquired evidence says
that even in a state following the common law rule of admissibility, the Rea
case prevents evidence unlawfully seized by a federal agent from being received
in a state trial.
In United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378 (D.D.C. 1957), there was for
some reason no pretrial motion to suppress blood test evidence obtained by
physical assault by District of Columbia police, but the trial court granted relief
by reversing the jury's guilty verdict and ordering a new trial. The court said it
would, if necessary, issue an injunction to prevent any testimony as to this evidence from being produced by District officers in any state court trial.
As authority for applying the Rea rule on a motion to set aside the jury's
verdict, rather than limiting it to suppressing evidence on a timely pretrial motion,
the court in Townsend cited United States v. Klapholz, 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1956).
There the defendant was indicted in the Southern District of New York but was
apprehended and arraigned and moved to suppress certain evidence in the Eastern
District of New York. The court suppressed the evidence, 17 F.R.D. 18 (E.D.N.Y.
1956), and the court of appeals affirmed. Prior to Rea the court said, "we had
supposed that except for suppression under Rule 41 (e) it lay in the exclusive
province of the trial court to control the admission of evidence on trial." 230 F.2d
at 497, n.3. But Rea, it said, gives federal courts "'supervisory powers over federal
law enforcement agencies'" and power to police them to see that they live up to
the requirements of the law. Id. at 497.
A dissent in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 (1959) (a double jeopardy,
not a search and seizure case), finds three justices of the Supreme Court citing Rea
for the broad position, not limited to the actual facts, "that an injunction should
issue against a federal agent's transference of illegally obtained evidence to state
authorities for use as the basis of a state charge. . . . [Flederal courts have the
power to defeat a state prosecution by force of their supervision of federal
officers ......
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had seized in violation of the Constitution itself."87 The Court prevents federal agents from producing evidence in a state trial if it is
seized contrary to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and
ordered suppressed in a prior federal trial, as set forth in the Rea
case. So far, however, federal agents are not precluded from submitting to a state court evidence seized in violation of the fourth
amendment when there has been no such federal adjudication. In
the future the Court may find this also "logically impossible" to
justify and may hold that federal agents may be enjoined in any
case from presenting in a state trial evidence seized in violation of
the fourth amendment.
Such a rule would be much too broad an extension of federal
authority. It would inevitably produce many a "race between a state
prosecution and a federal injunction proceeding."88 It would also
invite many a race between the defendant's lawyer, rushing to court
for a federal injunction, and federal agents, hurrying to turn illegally
seized evidence over to state authorities before the injunction issued,
at least in states retaining the common law rule of admissibility or
those federal rule states that apply a reverse "silver platter" doctrine,
excluding evidence illegally gathered by state police but admitting
that unlawfully obtained by federal officers.8 9 Such an encouragement
to subterfuge and evasion would not promote the law officer's respect
for law which the Court seeks to foster. A healthy federalism would
hardly be advanced by a requirement that virtually every prosecution
for a state crime for which a federal agent had helped collect evidence
must commence in a federal court proceeding to determine the
legality of the seizure, and then continue in a state court to the extent
permitted by federal decree.
8780 Sup. Ct. 1437, 1443 (1960).
8SRea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 221 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
89E.g., State v. Gardner, 77 Mont. 8, 249 Pac. 574 (1926); Johnson v. State,
155 Tenn. 628, 299 S.W. 800 (1927). Most federal rule states, however, reject
evidence unlawfully seized by federal agents as well as by state police. E.g., Little
v. State, 171 Miss. 818, 159 So. 103 (1935); Ramirez v. State, 123 Tex. Crim. 254,
58 S.W.2d 829 (1933); State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 Pac. 788 (1927). Others
will reject evidence illegally obtained by their own officers but admit that so
acquired by police of a sister state when the search was made in the latter state.
E.g., People v. Touhy, 361 Ili. 332, 197 N.E. 849 (1935); Young v. Commonwealth,
313 S.W.2d 580 (Ky. 1958); State v. Hunt, 280 S.W.2d 37 (Mo. 1955); State v.
Olsen, 212 Ore. 191, 317 P.2d 938 (1957) (to be excluded as illegally obtained the
evidence must have been the result of search and seizure by police of the prosecuting jurisdiction); Kauffman v. State, 189 Tenn. 315, 319, 225 S.W.2d 75, 76 (1949)
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CONCLUSION

The Elkins-Rios rule injects a long overdue element of logic, simplicity, and consistency into the law of admissibility of wrongfully
seized evidence. It is hoped that the Supreme Court will not undo
this good work when it decides the Pugach case- that it will either
(1) rule out federal injunctions against the production by state police
in state courts of wire-tap evidence permitted under state law, thus
limiting federal interference to the remedy (admittedly of doubtful
effectiveness) of prosecution of state officers violating the anti-wiretap statute, 90 or (2) confine federal injunctions strictly to clearly
threatened future wire-tap divulgences, making it plain that the
Stefanelli rule continues to prohibit federal interference with state
rules on admissibility of state-seized evidence, and that the Rea rule
permits a federal injunction against state use of federally seized
evidence only as an adjunct to a prior federal prosecution.
One final observation is offered to temper the opposing arguments
that the federal exclusionary rule, with all its procedural incidents,
(1) effectively disciplines police and deters lawless law enforcement,
or (2) needlessly hampers effective law enforcement activity. Lawyers,
courts, and legal writers tend to look upon successful criminal prosecution as the sole end of law enforcement activity. Actually, it is
but an extremely important means of accomplishing the end of
crime prevention. The fruit of a search without warrant may be
unusable as evidence in court but valuable as intelligence; though
it fails to produce a conviction, it may prevent a crime or wreck a
criminal syndicate or espionage apparatus. And even the individual
defendant who goes free knows that the knowledge of his activities
gained by police will increase the peril of future illegal operations.
As the state trial judge in Rios said, in finding that incriminating
heroin had been unlawfully seized: "'[Y]our motion to suppress the
evidence will be granted .... I find him not guilty as charged. They
will get you sometime, Rios; they didn't get you this time but they
will sometime.' 91

(admitting evidence seized illegally by Arkansas police, since they "were not
subject to the Constitution and laws of Tennessee in the performance of their
official duties").
90See Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 41
VA.

L.

REv.

621 (1955).

9180 Sup. Ct. 1431, 1435, n.3 (1960).
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APPENDIX
FEDERAL RULE STATES

Alaska. United States v. Pappadementro, 6 Alaska 769 (1922).
California. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955), overruling
People v. Le Doux, 155 Cal. 535, 102 Pac. 517 (1909), and intervening cases.
Delaware. Rickards v. State, 45 Del. 573, 77 A.2d 199 (1950), overruling State
v. Chuchola, 32 Del. 133, 120 Ad. 212 (1922).
Florida. Weiner v. Kelley, 82 So.2d 155 (Fla. 1955); Atz v. Andrews, 84 Fla. 43,
94 So. 329 (1922).
Hawaii. Territory v. Ho Me, 26 Hawaii 331 (1922).
Idaho. State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 Pac. 788 (1927); State v. Myers, 36
Idaho 396, 211 Pac. 440 (1922), overruling State v. Anderson, 31 Idaho 514, 174
Pac. 124 (1918).
Illinois. Chicago v. Lord, 7 I1. 2d 379, 130 N.E.2d 504 (1955); People v. Castree,
311, Il. 392, 143 N.E. 112 (1924), overruling Siebert v. People, 143 Ill. 571, 32 N.E.
431 (1892).
Indiana. Enlow v. State, 234 Ind. 156, 125 N.E.2d 250 (1955); Callender v.
State, 193 Ind. 91, 138 N.E. 817 (1923).
Kentucky. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 296 S.W.2d 210 (Ky. 1956); Parrott v.
Commonwealth, 287 S.W.2d 440 (Ky. 1956); Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky.
152, 224 S.W. 860 (1920).
Mississippi. Nobles v. State, 222 Miss. 827, 77 So.2d 288 (1955); Tucker v.
State, 128 Miss. 211, 90 So. 845 (1922).
Missouri. State v. Hunt, 280 S.W.2d 37 (Mo. 1955); State v. Owens, 302 Mo.
348 (1924).
Montana. State ex rel. King v. District Ct., 70 Mont. 191, 224 Par. 862 (1924).
But see per curiam memoranda in State ex rel. Sanders v. District Ct., 135 Mont.
602, 340 P.2d 166 (1959); State ex rel. France v. District Ct., 135 Mont. 600, 340
P.2d 166 (1959).
North Carolina. Federal rule adopted by statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§15-27
(1943), as amended, N.C. Laws 1951, ch. 644, referred to in State v. Ferguson, 238
N.C. 656, 78 S.E.2d 911 (1953). See also State v. Mills, 246 N.C. 237, 98 S.E.2d
329 (1957).
Oklahoma. Hamel v. State, 317 P.2d 285 (Okla. 1957); Sanders v. State, 287
P.2d 458 (Okla. 1955); Gore v. State, 24 Okla. Crim. 394, 218 Pac. 545 (1923).
Rhode Island. Federal rule adopted by statute, P.L. 1955, ch. 3590; R.I. GEN.
LAws §9-19-25 (1956), abrogating common law rule adopted in State v. Olynik, 83
R.I. 31, 113 A.2d 123 (1955). Statute held not retroactive, State v. Hillman, 84
R.I. 396, 125 A.2d 94 (1956).
Tennessee. McDonald v. State, 195 Tenn. 282, 259 S.W.2d 524 (1952); Hughes
v. State, 145 Tenn. 544, 238 S.W. 588 (1921).
Texas. Federal rule adopted by Tax. CODE CaM. PROC. ANN. §727a (1941, as
amended, Supp. 1960), changing the former rule of Welchek v. State, 93 Tex. Crim.
271, 247 S.W. 524 (1923). The federal rule was applied in Williamson v. State,
156 Tex. Crim. 520, 244 S.W.2d 202 (1951).
Washington. State v. Cyr, 40 Wash. 2d 840, 246 P.2d 480 (1952); State v.
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Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 Pac. 390 (1922).
West Virginia. State v. Calandros, 140 W. Va. 720, 86 S.E.2d 242 (1955) (not applicable to illegal search of premises of one other than defendant); State v. Wills,
91 W. Va. 659, 114 S.E. 261 (1922).
Wisconsin. State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266, 79 N.W.2d 810 (1956).
Wyoming. State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 231 Pac. 683 (1924).
LIMITED FEDERAL RULE STATES

Alabama. Illegally obtained evidence must be excluded from trials of certain
alcoholic beverage control offenses under ALA. CODE tit. 29, §210 (Supp. 1955).
Otherwise, illegally acquired evidence is admissible. Oldham v. State, 259 Ala.
507, 67 So. 2d 55 (1953); Banks v. State, 207 Ala. 179, 93 So. 293, cert. denied, 260
U.S. 736 (1921); Shields v. State, 104 Ala. 35, 16 So. 85 (1893).
Michigan. MICH. CONsT. art. 2, §10, permits introduction of weapons seized
outside the curtilage of a dwelling. People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247, 97 N.W.2d
16 (1959). Otherwise Michigan follows the exclusionary rule. People v. Bissionette,
327 Mich. 349, 42 N.W.2d 113 (1950); People v. Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559, 171
N.W. 557 (1919).
Maryland. MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, §5 (1957) requires exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence in trial of most misdemeanors. Otherwise such evidence is admissible. Martin v. State, 203 Md. 66, 98 A.2d 8 (1953); Meisinger v. State, 155 Md.
195, 141 At. 536 (1928).
South Dakota. S.D. CODE §34.1102 (Supp. 1960) allows admission of evidence
obtained in unlawful search and seizure provided it was obtained under color of
a search warrant. State v. Lane, 76 S.D. 544, 82 N.W.2d 286 (1957). If not so
obtained, illegally acquired evidence is excluded. State v. Poppenga, 76 S.D. 592,
83 N.W.2d 518 (1957).
COMMON LAw RULE STATES

Arizona. State v. Thomas, 78 Ariz. 52, 275 P.2d 408 (1954), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 950 (1956); State v. Frye, 58 Ariz. 409, 120 P.2d 793 (1942).
Arkansas. Lane, Smith & Barg v. State, 217 Ark. 114, 229 S.W.2d 43 (1950).
Colorado. Williams v. People, 136 Colo. 164, 315 P.2d 189 (1957); Wolf v.
People, 117 Colo. 279, 187 P.2d 926 (1947), af'd, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Massantonio
v. People, 77 Colo. 392, 236 Pac. 1019 (1925).
Connecticut. State v. Zukausakas, 132 Conn. 450, 45 A.2d 289 (1945); State v.
Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 125 At. 636 (1924).
Georgia. Atterberry v. State, 212 Ga. 778, 95 S.E.2d 787 (1956); Williams v.
State, 100 Ga. 511, 28 S.E. 624 (1897); Sideh v. State, 91 Ga. App. 387, 85 S.E.2d
610 (1955).
Iowa. State v. Smith, 247 Iowa 500, 73 N.W.2d 189 (1955); State ex tel. Kuble
v. Bisignano, 238 Iowa 1060, 28 N.W.2d 504 (1947); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94,
191 N.W. 530 (1923). Originally Iowa had been the only state to exclude illegally
obtained evidence before the Weeks decision. State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 96
N.W. 730 (1903).
Kansas. State v. Peasley, 179 Kan. 314, 295 P.2d 627 (1956); State v. Kelley, 125
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Kan. 805, 265 Pac. 1109 (1928).
Louisiana. State v. Mastricovo, 221 La. 312, 59 So.2d 403 (1952); State v. Creel,
152 La. 888, 94 So. 433 (1922).
Maine. State v. Schoppe, 113 Me. 10, 92 At. 867 (1915); State v. Burroughs, 72
Me. 479 (1881).
Massachusetts. Commonwealth v. Mercier, 257 Mass. 353, 153 N.E. 834 (1926);
Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841).
Minnesota. State v. Siporen, 215 Minn. 438, 10 N.W.2d 353 (1943).
Nebraska. Haswell v. State, 167 Neb. 169, 92 N.W.2d 161 (1958); Billings
v. State, 109 Neb. 596, 191 N.W. 721 (1923).
Nevada. Terrano v. State, 59 Nev. 247, 91 P.2d 67 (1939); State v. Chin Gim,
47 Nev. 431, 224 Pac. 798 (1924).
New Hampshire. State v. Mara, 96 N.H. 463, 78 A.2d 922 (1951); State v. Flynn,
36 N.H. 64 (1858).
New Jersey. Eleuteri v. Richman, 26 N.J. 506, 141 A.2d 46 (1958) (citing an
unsuccessful attempt to amend the state constitution to exclude such evidence);
State v. Lyons, 99 N.J.L. 301, 122 Ad. 758 (1923); Re 301-317 Clinton Ave., 35
N.J. Super. 136, 113 A.2d 208 (County Ct. 1955).
New Mexico. Breithaupt v. Abram, 58 N.M. 385, 271 P.2d 827 (1954), aff'd,
352 U.S. 432 (1957); State v. Dillion, 34 N.M. 366, 281 Pac. 474 (1929).
New York. People v. Variano, 5 N.Y.2d 391, 157 N.E.2d 857 (1959); People v.
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UNDECDED STATES

Oregon. In State v. Laundy, 103 Ore. 443, 204 Pac. 958, 975 (1922), the court
said that the exclusionary rule ought to be followed. But in State v. Hoover, 347
P.2d 69, 72 (Ore. 1959), the court dismissed the Laundy statement as dictum. In
affirming a conviction it found that the evidence in question was lawfully seized,
so it was "unnecessary to determine whether evidence obtained by an unlawful
search is admissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution. . . . We have never
been confronted with a case which has squarely demanded a decision to accept
or reject the dictum of the Laundy case."
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